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The history of philosophy in contemporary philosophy: The view from Germany
Authors:Lorenz B. Puntel
Affiliation:(1) Institut für Philosophie University of Munich, Munich, Germany
Abstract:Conclusion I have frequently mentioned objective problems and topics in the preceding sections. But what exactly is the force of lsquoobjectiversquo here? As my remarks should have made clear I have been using lsquoobjectiversquo to contrast with lsquopurely historicalrsquo. A lsquopurely historicalrsquo approach never gets beyond reproduction, commentary, and interpretation. I call an approach lsquoobjectiversquo when it involves a philosopher who advances his own theses and claims.This minimal understanding of lsquoobjectivityrsquo (in the context of my remarks in this paper) by no means implies that there are problems and topics, systems of concepts, methods, and similar factors that are lsquoeternalrsquo, completely independent of the contingencies of history (of philosophy, of the sciences), that are not relative to a language, to a logic, to a model, etc. Indeed whether there are problems, etc., in just this absolute, atemporal sense is itself a question for systematic philosophy. It seems clear that the formulation of a problem can only take place against a cognitive background of some sort and within some lsquoconceptual schemersquo.34 Such an assumption is made by most if not all analytic philosophers. But the fact that a philosophical tradition recognizes lsquoconceptual schemesrsquo does not make it a lsquopurely historicalrsquo, non-objective philosophy, in the sense already introduced and described. A philosopher who explicitly accepts a certain lsquoconceptual schemersquo proceeds in an entirely objective and systematic (and not purely historical) manner when, within this framework, he formulates his own theses.This paper is the text of a talk. the title is due to Barry Smith.
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