Larger reward values alone are not enough to entice more cooperation |
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Authors: | Fábio P Leite |
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Institution: | 1. Department of Psychology , The Ohio State University , Lima, OH, USA leite.11@osu.edu |
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Abstract: | Two experiments using an iterated prisoner's dilemma game examined under which conditions participants' cooperation rates would either change due to monetary value changes (e.g., 3 cents to 3 dollars) or not change due to numeric value changes (e.g., 3 dollars to 300 cents). A total of 102 university students played the game against a computer that employed one of four strategies across blocks. Results showed high rates of cooperation when participants played against a tit-for-tat strategy and low rates of cooperation against a random strategy. There was no change in cooperation rates due to changes in numeric value alone and a decrease in cooperation rates when large monetary values were at stake. Cooperation rates were higher and cooperation responses slower at earlier stages of the game. I argue that people's ability to strategize plays a key role in the changing rates and speed of cooperative behaviour in the prisoner's dilemma. |
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Keywords: | Cooperation Decision Prisoner's dilemma Response time Rewards |
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