Higher-order preferences and the Master Rationality Motive

The cognitive critique of the goals and desires that are input into the implicit calculations that result in instrumental rationality is one aspect of what has been termed broad rationality (Elster, 1983 Elster, J. 1983. Sour grapes: Studies in the subversion of rationality, Cambridge, , UK: Cambridge University Press. Crossref] , Google Scholar]). This cognitive critique involves, among other things, the search for rational integration (Nozick, 1993 Nozick, R. 1993. The nature of rationality, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.  Google Scholar])—that is, consistency between first-order and second-order preferences. Forming a second-order preference involves metarepresentational abilities made possible by mental decoupling operations. However, these decoupling abilities are separable from the motive that initiates the cognitive critique itself. I argue that Velleman (1992 Velleman, J. D. 1992. What happens when somebody acts?. Mind, 101: 461–481. Crossref], Web of Science ®] , Google Scholar]) has identified that motive (“the desire to act in accordance with reasons”), and that it might be operationalisable as a thinking disposition at a very superordinate cognitive level. This thinking disposition, the Master Rationality Motive, is likely to be of particular importance in explaining individual differences in the tendency to seek rational integration. Preliminary research on related constructs suggests that this construct is measurable.