Abstract: | In an experimental study of “entrapping” conflicts —situations in which a decisionmaker may continue to expend resources in part to justify previous expenditures—subjects were given an initial stake of $4.00 and had the opportunity to win an additional $2.00 jackpot. Two independent variables (Process of Resource Allocation and Prior Limit-Setting) were combined in a 2 × 3 design. Once the subjects had started to invest, half of them had to make an “active” decision to continue. Unless they actively decided to continue, their investments automatically ceased and they were no longer eligible for the jackpot (Selfterminating condition). The other half only had to make a “passive” decision to continue. Unless they actively decided to dis continue, their investments for the jackpot automatically increased (Self-sustaining condition). In addition, before investments began, some subjects were asked to inform the experimenter of the nonbinding limit they had set on the amount they planned to invest (Public condition), some were asked to set a limit which they kept to themselves (Private condition), while a third group was not asked to set a limit (Control condition). Subjects invested significantly more money in the Self-sustaining condition. Also, investments were somewhat greater in the Control than the Public condition. Although the mean investments in the Public and Private conditions did not differ, those in the Public condition deviated significantly less from their earlier set limits, suggesting greater commitment to these limits. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed. |