Fitting Attitudes, Welfare, and Time |
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| Authors: | Jens Johansson |
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| Affiliation: | (1) Department of Philosophy, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK;(2) Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford, Littlegate House, St Ebbe’s Street, Oxford, OX1 1PT, UK |
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| Abstract: | Chris Heathwood has recently put forward a novel and ingenious argument against the view that intrinsic value is analyzable in terms of fitting attitudes. According to Heathwood, this view holds water only if the related but distinct concept of welfare—intrinsic value for a person—can be analyzed in terms of fitting attitudes too. Moreover, he argues against such an analysis of welfare by appealing to the rationality of our bias towards the future. In this paper, I argue that so long as we keep the tenses and the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction right, the fitting-attitudes analysis of welfare can be shown to survive Heathwood’s criticism. |
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| Keywords: | Intrinsic value Welfare Fitting attitudes Bias towards the future |
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