Asymmetrical scepticism towards criminal evidence: The role of goal‐ and belief‐consistency

Previous demonstrations of asymmetrical scepticism (i.e., that investigators perceive evidence inconsistent vs. consistent] with the focal hypothesis of a case as less reliable) have failed to account for the underlying mechanism. This study examined whether inconsistent evidence is discredited due to its inconsistency with a prior belief or because it conflicts with the goal to reach closure in a case. Police trainees (N = 107) were presented with a homicide case and judged the reliability of incriminating or exonerating evidence while entertaining a ‘guilty’ or ‘innocent’ hypothesis concerning a suspect. Asymmetrical scepticism was observed in the guilty condition, but not in the innocent condition, partially supporting the goal‐consistency explanation. Implications for the organization of criminal investigations are discussed. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.