Not Sitting Down for It: How Stand-Up Differs from Fiction (And How Neither Is Immune to Ethical Criticism) |
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Authors: | E. M. DADLEZ |
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Affiliation: | Humanities and Philosophy, University of Central Oklahoma, Edmond, Oklahoma |
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Abstract: | One of the standard defenses of Daniel Tosh, Andrew Dice Clay, Bernard Manning, and other stand-up comedians who have been accused of crossing moral lines is that the responses they elicit belong to an aesthetic rather than a moral domain to which standard methods of ethical evaluation are therefore inapplicable. I argue, first, that fictionality does not confer immunity to ethical criticism and, second, that the stance adopted by the stand-up artist is not fully analogous to a fictive one in any event. Whatever the case with respect to the adoption of an alternative persona, the stand-up artist refers in his or her pronouncements to the actual world in a way that a fiction does not. That also suggests susceptibility to ethical criticism, just for different reasons. |
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