Interpretation and its "Metaphysical" Entanglements

Singularism is the view that for a given object of interpretation there must be one and only one admissible interpretation of it. And multiplism is the view that for a given object of interpretation there may be more than one admissible interpretation of it. My book, Rightness and Reasons , argued that singularism and multiplism are logically detachable from the ontological theories of realism and constructivism. This paper extends the range of ontologies to include constructive realism, whose versions include those of Joseph Margolis, Rom Harré, Paul Thom, and Hilary Putnam. They all disagree with both realism and constructivism. But their ontologies are also logically detachable from singularism and multiplism. Finally, the detachability of these ontologies from singularism and multiplism does not preclude wider "metaphysical" considerations (such as intentionality) in a ramified theory of interpretation.