Analytical Buddhism: The Two-Tiered Illusion of Self

In the contemporary debate on the nature of autonomy, it is generally taken for granted that autonomy is to be understood as rule by the self, with the debate centring on how that self is to be identified. Garnett 2013b Garnett, Michael 2013b. The Autonomous Life: A Pure Social View, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91/4. Google Scholar]] has recently proposed a theory that rejects the dominant understanding of autonomy as rule by the self and views it instead as resistance to rule by others. According to that theory, an autonomous agent is one whose various ‘autonomy traits’ render her sufficiently resistant to subjection to foreign wills. I argue that Garnett has not given us good reason to abandon the understanding of autonomy as rule by the self. His account is plausible only if it is understood to require for autonomy the possession of at least one trait with which the agent can be identified. And the best explanation of the necessity of some such trait(s) is offered, not by Garnett's, but by the dominant understanding of autonomy he rejects.