| Abstract: | Those who accept the necessity of mereological universalism face what has come to be known as the ‘junk argument’ due to Bohn 2009 Bohn, Einar D. 2009a. An Argument Against the Necessity of Unrestricted Composition, Analysis 69/1: 27–31.Crossref], Web of Science ®] , Google Scholar]], which proceeds from (i) the incompatibility of junk with universalism and (ii) the possibility of junk, to conclude that mereological universalism isn't metaphysically necessary. Most attention has focused on (ii); however, recent authors have cast doubt on (i). This paper undertakes a defence of premise (i) against three main objections. The first is a new objection to the effect that Bohn's defence of that premise presupposes far too much. I show that one can defend premise (i) from a much weaker set of assumptions. The second objection, due to Contessa 2012 Contessa, Gabriel 2012. The Junk Argument: Safe Disposal Guidelines for Mereological Universalists, Analysis 72/3: 455–7.Crossref], Web of Science ®] , Google Scholar]], is that those who accept unrestricted composition should only accept the existence of binary sums (which are compatible with junk) rather than infinitary fusions. I argue that this conception of unrestricted composition is problematic: it is in conflict with an intuitive remainder principle. The final objection is due to Spencer 2012 Spencer, Joshua. 2012. All Things Must Pass Away, in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 7, ed. Karen Bennett and Dean W. Zimmerman, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 67–92.Crossref] , Google Scholar]]. His view is that there is no absolutely unrestricted plural universal quantifier; so any statement of the unrestricted fusion axiom will simply not rule out the existence of junky worlds. I argue that the failure of unrestricted quantification will not be enough by itself to establish the existence of junk. Furthermore, it is not clear whether this view counts as a form of mereological universalism. As a result, I suggest that if one wants to reject the junk argument, premise (ii) is the only viable option. |
