An investigation of reciprocity and reinforcement theories of bargaining behavior |
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| Affiliation: | 1. LoyolaBehLAB, Universidad Loyola Andalucía, Spain;2. Universidad Carlos III de Madrid and CEPR, Spain;3. Univ. Bourgogne Franche Comté, Burgundy School of Business – CEREN and University of Valencia, Spain;4. Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, UMICCS, BIFI, GISC, and IBiDat, Spain;5. Univ. Bourgogne Franche Comté, Burgundy School of Business, CEREN, Spain;1. SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Faculty of Psychology in Warsaw, Poland;2. Leuphana University Lüneburg, Institute of Management and Organization, Germany;3. SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Faculty of Psychology in Wroclaw, Poland |
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| Abstract: | The three experiments reported here investigated some determinants of a negotiator's bargaining. The first two experiments, investigating the effects of an opponent's concessions, revealed that the negotiator does not reciprocate the opponent's concessions nor does he retain the expectation that his own concessions will be reciprocated. Rather he repeats those concessions that are reinforced by large opponent concessions. The third experiment examined the effects that opponent reinforcements (concessions) and constituent reinforcements produced in the negotiator's bargaining. It was found that constituent reinforcements altered the negotiator's bargaining and the opponent reinforcements interacted with those of the constituent to affect the negotiator's behavior. However the opponent reinforcements produced no main effects. |
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