Possible knowledge of unknown truth |
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Authors: | Dorothy Edgington |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Linguistics & Philosophy, MIT, 77 Massachusetts Avenue, 32-d808, Cambridge, MA 02139-4307, USA |
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Abstract: | Fitch’s argument purports to show that for any unknown truth, p, there is an unknowable truth, namely, that p is true and unknown; for a contradiction follows from the assumption that it is possible to know that p is true and unknown. In earlier work I argued that there is a sense in which it is possible to know that p is true and unknown, from a counterfactual perspective; that is, there can be possible, non-actual knowledge, of the actual
situation, that in that situation, p is true and unknown. Here I further elaborate that claim and respond to objections by Williamson, who argued that there cannot
be non-trivial knowledge of this kind. I give conditions which suffice for such non-trivial counterfactual knowledge. |
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