A new argument for skepticism |
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Authors: | Baron Reed |
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Affiliation: | (1) Department of Philosophy, Northwestern University, 1880 Campus Drive, Evanston, IL 60208, USA |
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Abstract: | The traditional argument for skepticism relies on a comparison between a normal subject and a subject in a skeptical scenario: because there is no relevant difference between them, neither has knowledge. Externalists respond by arguing that there is in fact a relevant difference—the normal subject is properly situated in her environment. I argue, however, that there is another sort of comparison available—one between a normal subject and a subject with a belief that is accidentally true—that makes possible a new argument for skepticism. Unlike the traditional form of skeptical argument, this new argument applies equally well to both internalist and externalist theories of knowledge. |
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Keywords: | Knowledge Skepticism Externalism Gettier problem |
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