On the alleged connection between Moral Evil and human freedom: Response to Nagasawa and Trakakis |
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Authors: | Email author" target="_blank">Joel?Thomas?TiernoEmail author |
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Institution: | (1) Dept of Philosophy, Community College of Southern Nevada, Nevada, USA |
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Abstract: | In this essay, I respond to two criticisms of my essay, ‘On the Alleged Connection between Moral Evil and Human Freedom’.
According to Yujin Nagasawa, I equivocate on the meaning of ‘moral evil.’ I respond by offering what I believe to be an unobjectionable
stipulative under-standing of what counts as moral evil which is sufficient for my argument. According to Nick Trakakis, I
seriously misunderstand the conception of freedom characteristic of free will theodicists. He suggests that my argument presupposes
compatibilism. I respond by showing that my argument does not presuppose the denial of the capacity to have done otherwise. |
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