Moore-paradoxical belief, conscious belief and the epistemic Ramsey test |
| |
Authors: | John N. Williams |
| |
Affiliation: | 1. School of Social Sciences, Singapore Management University, 90 Stamford Road, Singapore, 178903, Singapore
|
| |
Abstract: | Chalmers and Hájek argue that on an epistemic reading of Ramsey??s test for the rational acceptability of conditionals, it is faulty. They claim that applying the test to each of a certain pair of conditionals requires one to think that one is omniscient or infallible, unless one forms irrational Moore-paradoxical beliefs. I show that this claim is false. The epistemic Ramsey test is indeed faulty. Applying it requires that one think of anyone as all-believing and if one is rational, to think of anyone as infallible-if-rational. But this is not because of Moore-paradoxical beliefs. Rather it is because applying the test requires a certain supposition about conscious belief. It is important to understand the nature of this supposition. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|