Choosing to believe |
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Authors: | Ronney Mourad |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Religious Studies, Albion College, 611E. Porter St., Albion, MI 49224, USA |
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Abstract: | This article defends a regulative ethics of voluntary belief. In order to determine the occasion and the scope of such an
ethics, the article begins with an examination of the concept of belief in conversation with the view of J. L. Schellenberg.
Next, against the dominant position in contemporary epistemology, it argues that some beliefs can be voluntary, in the sense
that they are under the immediate control of the believer, and replies to William Alston’s influential objections to doxastic
voluntarism. If some beliefs are subject to the immediate control of the believer, then in these cases believers are ethically
responsible not only for how they investigate those beliefs, but also for the choice of whether or not to believe them. The
article concludes by formulating and defending two types of regulative ethical principles governing voluntary belief. |
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Keywords: | Belief Ethics William Alston J L Schellenberg Doxastic voluntarism Evidentialism Faith Self-deception |
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