Children’s solutions of logical versus empirical problems: What’s missing and what develops? |
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摘 要: |
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收稿时间: | 1 June 1999 |
修稿时间: | 1 August 2001 |
Children’s solutions of logical versus empirical problems: What’s missing and what develops? |
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Authors: | Bradley J Morris Vladimir Sloutsky |
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Institution: | 2. Department of Molecular and Cellular Neurobiology, Center for Neurogenomics and Cognitive Research, Neuroscience Campus Amsterdam, VU Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands;2. University of Graz, Graz, Austria |
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Abstract: | This research examined the development of the ability to differentiate logical from empirical problems and the different ways in which children solve these problems. Thirty-two 4- and 5-year-olds, thirty-four 8- and 9-year-olds, and thirty-five 11- and 12-year-olds were given five questions regarding an imaginary character’s predictions as to where a ball would land after being dropped through a ‘tautology machine’. The questions examined encoding and recall of problems, children’s understanding of when evidence was necessary, and children’s evaluation of form and evidence. Data were analyzed in two ways: (1) by comparing differences across participants on component questions and (2) an individual analysis examining the consistency of responses to component questions across the problem set. Overall, the results indicated that: (1) sixth graders tended to differentiate logical from empirical problems while preschool and third grade children rarely did; (2) young children tend to ignore both the logical connective and the second half of problems-termed a ‘cut;’ (3) these cuts are less frequent when a problem is compatible with one empirical possibility; (4) cuts do not stem from encoding or recall errors, but seem to be the product of incomplete problem processing and (5) from third to sixth grade, children’s understanding of logical form increased as the rate of cuts decreased. |
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Keywords: | Children Logical problem Empirical statement |
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