Consciousness operationalized,a debate realigned |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Department of Philosophy, University of Maryland, United States;2. Department of Philosophy, University of Michigan–Flint, United States;1. Université de Toulouse, UPS, Centre de Recherche Cerveau et Cognition, Toulouse, France;2. CerCo, CNRS UMR 5549, Toulouse, France;3. Berlin School of Mind and Brain, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany;4. Cognitive Neuroscience Research Unit, Center of Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark;5. Consciousness Lab, Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland;6. Institute of Psychology, University of Münster, Germany;1. Yıldırım Beyazıt University, Faculty of Medicine, Department of Psychiatry, Ankara, Turkey;2. Ankara Atatürk Training and Education Hospital, Department of Psychiatry, Ankara, Turkey;3. Istanbul Kultur University, Brain Dynamics, Cognition and Complex Systems Research Center, Ataköy Campus Bakırköy, 34156 Istanbul, Turkey;4. Maltepe University, Faculty of Medicine, Department of Psychiatry, Istanbul, Turkey;1. Department of Neurochemistry, Institute of Psychiatry and Neurology, 9 Sobieskiego Street, 02-957 Warsaw, Poland;2. Department of Experimental and Clinical Pharmacology, Medical University of Warsaw, Centre for Preclinical Research and Technology CEPT, 1B Banacha Streeet, 02-097 Warsaw, Poland;1. Nakgaoka University of Technology, Nagaoka, Niigata, Japan;2. T-Method, Sapporo, Hokkaido, Japan |
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| Abstract: | This paper revisits the debate about cognitive phenomenology. It elaborates, defends, and improves on our earlier proposal for resolving that debate, according to which the test for irreducible phenomenology is the presence of explanatory gaps. After showing how proposals like ours have been misunderstood or misused by others, we deploy our operationalization to argue that the correct way to align the debate over cognitive phenomenology is not between sensory and (alleged) cognitive phenomenology, but rather between non-conceptual and (alleged) conceptual or propositional phenomenology. In doing so we defend three varieties of non-sensory (amodal)1 non-conceptual phenomenology: valence, a sense of approximate number, and a sense of elapsed time. |
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| Keywords: | Access consciousness Amodal experience Cognitive phenomenology Hard problem Phenomenal consciousness Zombie |
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