Predictions,precision, and agentive attention |
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| Institution: | 1. Institute of Zoology, Zoological Society of London, Regent''s Park, London NW1 4RY, United Kingdom;2. Centre for Biodiversity and Environment Research, Department of Genetics, Evolution and Environment, University College London, Darwin Building, Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT, United Kingdom;3. Mauritian Wildlife Foundation, Grannum Road, Vacoas, Mauritius;4. Edinburgh Napier University, School of Life, Sport and Sciences, Sighthill Campus, Edinburgh EH11 4BN, United Kingdom;5. Durrell Wildlife Conservation Trust, Les Augrès Manor, Trinity, Jersey JE3 5BP, Channel Islands, United Kingdom |
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| Abstract: | Ransom, Fazelpour, and Mole (this journal - 2017) raise an important puzzle for the ‘prediction error minimization’ account of cognitive processing. That account depicts all cognitive processing as fundamentally in the business of minimizing prediction errors concerning the evolving flow of sensory information. One of the cornerstones of these highly ambitious, would-be unifying accounts is their depiction of attention as nothing other than the process of optimizing the precision (inverse variance) of critical prediction error signals. But that story, Ransom et al. suggest, cannot accommodate voluntary shifts of attention. In this paper, I show why this challenge to the grand unifying project fails. It fails because it locates the origins of voluntary attention in complexes of unanalyzed desire rather than in changing complexes of beliefs. |
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| Keywords: | Attention Voluntary attention Prediction Prediction error minimization Mental action |
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