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Wittgenstein on Dreaming and Skepticism
Authors:Segatto  Antonio Ianni
Institution:1.Department of Social Sciences, São Paulo State University, Rod. Araraquara-Jau, Km 1, Araraquara, SP, 14800-901, Brazil
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Abstract:

In this paper I aim to elucidate Wittgenstein’s claim that the so-called dream argument is senseless. Unlike other interpreters, who understand the sentence “I am dreaming” as contradictory or self-defeating, I intend to elucidate in what sense one should understand it as senseless or, more precisely, as nonsensical. In this sense, I propose to understand the above-mentioned claim in light of Wittgenstein’s criticism of skepticism from the Tractatus logico-philosophicus to his last writings. I intend to show that the words “I am dreaming” are nonsensical in the same sense as the alleged proposition “There are physical objects” or the expression of doubt about the existence of external objects.

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