The Question of Internationalism in Philosophy and Aesthetics

In this article aesthetics is treated purely as a branch of philosophy, and the points made are intended to apply both to philosophy more generally and aesthetics more specifically. The manner in which internationalism obviously has to do with the organization of the disciplines is discussed. Does it have any bearing on their content or substance? The distinction between organization and content is probed and seen to be much less obvious than at first sight apparent and is doubtfully tenable. Nations are foreign to philosophy in two respects. First we would remain philosophically impoverished if we attended only to the philosophy produced in our own nation. Secondly, and more interestingly, nations cannot be the subject of philosophy since they are individuals. Individuals can only be of philosophical interest in so far as they can be identified under general categories; then what matters is the category, not the individual. Philosophy, including philosophy of art, can only be interested in individuals as first-order examples or illustrations of more general second-order claims or theses. So nations must be excluded from the domain of philosophy. It does not follow that such exclusion amounts to internationalism. Indeed though internationalism itself might be a philosophical idea the dismissal of nations as philosophically irrelevant more obviously represents a commitment to universalism than to internationalism. Internationalism and universalism should not be confused though they overlap. Universalism is the ideal of the so-called enlightenment project which is defended in this paper against post-modernist criticism and also against the charge that it constitutes a view from nowhere. The view from nowhere is in the strictest sense utopian and for that reason is to be championed as a means for criticising our current assumptions and beliefs and not dismissed. Overt bias including national bias is not a problem, though the writer of philosophy must strive against it on pain of failing to write philosophy. A writer, however, can only guard against overt prejudice and bias. But a text, whether or not philosophical, is also silently exclusionary, that is, there are groups it silently excludes. At a later date the reader can often detect examples of silent exclusion. Since these silences are indefinitely many, it is always possible for a group to feel excluded. The important philosophical point is to concede the possibility of linguistic and indeed conceptual exclusion, to study its mechanisms and to consider on what principles, if any, a moral charge of exclusion is justified and when not.