Keeping quiet on the ontology of models |
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Authors: | Steven French |
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Institution: | (1) Dipartimento di Processi Formativi, University of Catania, Via Biblioteca 4 (p.zzo Ingrassia), 95124 Catania, Italy |
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Abstract: | Stein once urged us not to confuse the means of representation with that which is being represented. Yet that is precisely
what philosophers of science appear to have done at the meta-level when it comes to representing the practice of science.
Proponents of the so-called ‘syntactic’ view identify theories as logically closed sets of sentences or propositions and models
as idealised interpretations, or ‘theoruncula, as Braithwaite called them. Adherents of the ‘semantic’ approach, on the other
hand, are typically characterised as taking them to be families of models that are set-theoretic, according to Suppes and
others, or abstract, as Giere has argued. da Costa and French (Science and Partial Truth. OUP, Oxford, 2003) suggested that
we should refrain from ontological speculation as to the nature of scientific theories and models and focus on their appropriate
representation for various purposes within the philosophy of science. Such an approach allows both linguistic and non-linguistic
resources to play their appropriate role (see also French and Saatsi, Philosophy of Science, Proceedings of the 2004 PSA Meeting,
78:548–559, 2006) and can be supported by recent case studies illustrating the heterogeneity of scientific practice. My aim
in this paper is to further develop this ‘quietist’ view, and to indicate how it offers a fruitful way forward for the philosophy
of science. |
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