Opening a conceptual space for metamemory experience |
| |
| Affiliation: | 1. Department of Philosophy, Grinnell College, 1120 Park St, Grinnell, IA, 50112, USA;2. Department of Neurology, Emory University, 101 Woodruff Circle, Atlanta, GA, 30322, USA;3. Department of Pediatrics, Emory University, 101 Woodruff Circle, Atlanta, GA, 30322, USA;4. Department of Neurology, University of Washington School of Medicine, Seattle, WA, 98105, USA;5. Department of Biomedical Engineering, The Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, 30332, USA;6. Simulation Science & Immersive Technology, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, 85281, USA;7. Department of Psychology, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO, 80525, USA;1. Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences, Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium;2. Department of Family Relations and Applied Nutrition, University of Guelph, Canada;1. Experimental Psychology Unit, Helmut-Schmidt-University/University of the Federal Armed Forces Hamburg, Holstenhofweg 85, 22043, Hamburg, Germany;2. Faculty of Life Sciences, Medical School Hamburg, Am Kaiserkai 1, 20457, Hamburg, Germany;1. Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences, University of Coimbra, Coimbra, Portugal;2. Centre for Research in Neuropsychology and Cognitive Behavioral Intervention, University of Coimbra, Portugal;3. Sleep Medicine Centre, CHUC (Coimbra Hospital and University Centre), Coimbra, Portugal;1. Edith Cowan University, School of Arts and Humanities, Joondalup, 6027, Western Australia, Australia;2. Mary Immaculate College∼University of Limerick, South Circular Road, Limerick, V94 VN26, Ireland |
| |
| Abstract: | The experiences associated with remembering, including metamemory feelings about the act of remembering and attempts at remembering, are not often integrated into general accounts of memory. For example, David Rubin (2022) proposes a unified, three-dimensional conceptual space for mapping memory states, a map that does not systematically specify metamemory feelings. Drawing on Rubin's model, we define a distinct role for metamemory in relation to first-order memory content. We propose a fourth dimension for the model and support the proposal with conceptual, neurocognitive, and clinical lines of reasoning. We use the modified model to illustrate several cases, and show how it helps to conceptualize a new category of memory state: autonoetic knowing, exemplified by déjà vu. We also caution not to assume that memory experience is directly correlated with or caused by memory content, an assumption Tulving (1989) labeled the doctrine of concordance. |
| |
| Keywords: | Consciousness Memory Metamemory Phenomenology Déjà vu Concordance |
| 本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录！ |
|
