A problem for Russellian theories of belief |
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Authors: | Gary Ostertag |
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Institution: | (1) Philosophy Department, University of Massachusetts-Amherst, Amherst, MA 01003-9269, USA;(2) Philosophy Department, Nassau Community College, Garden City, NY 11530-6793, USA |
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Abstract: | Russellianism is characterized as the view that ‘that’-clauses refer to Russellian propositions, familiar set-theoretic pairings
of objects and properties. Two belief-reporting sentences, S and S*, possessing the same Russellian content, but differing in their intuitive truthvalue, are provided. It is argued that no
Russellian explanation of the difference in apparent truthvalue is available, with the upshot that the Russellian fails to
explain how a speaker who asserts S but rejects S* can be innocent of inconsistency, either in what she says or, at least,
in what she implicates. Yet, while there is no semantic or pragmatic explanation of the substitution failure consistent with
Russellianism, there remains the possibility of a purely psychological explanation that is, nonetheless, Russellian. This
is an attractive option. It comes at a cost, however, since, in abandoning the project of providing a semantic or pragmatic
explanation of anti-substitutivity intuitions, the Russellian is no longer in the business of explaining how a rational, well-informed
speaker, with no incentive to mislead, can avoid inconsistency in reporting the facts as they appear. |
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Keywords: | |
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