Motor intentionality and the case of Schneider |
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Authors: | Rasmus Thybo Jensen |
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Affiliation: | (1) Center of Subjectivity Research & Sect. for Philosophy, Department of Media, Cognition and Communication, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark |
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Abstract: | I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s use of the case of Schneider in his arguments for the existence of non-conconceptual and non-representational motor intentionality contains a problematic methodological ambiguity. Motor intentionality is both to be revealed by its perspicuous preservation and by its contrastive impairment in one and the same case. To resolve the resulting contradiction I suggest we emphasize the second of Merleau-Ponty’s two lines of argument. I argue that this interpretation is the one in best accordance both with Merleau-Ponty’s general methodology and with the empirical case of Schneider as it was described by Gelb and Goldstein. |
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Keywords: | Motor intentionality Bodily agency Merleau-Ponty The case of Schneider Neuropsychology |
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