African philosophy and global epistemic injustice |
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Authors: | Jonathan O Chimakonam |
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Institution: | 1. Department of Philosophy, University of Calabar, Calabar, Nigeria;2. Department of Philosophy, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa |
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Abstract: | In this paper, I consider how the discourse on global epistemic justice might be approached differently if some contributions from the African philosophical place are taken seriously. To be specific, I argue that the debate on global justice broadly has not been global. I cite as an example, the exclusion or marginalisation of African philosophy, what it has contributed and what it may yet contribute to the global epistemic edifice. I point out that this exclusion is a case of epistemic injustice. I observe that the absence of a philosophical technique that prevails on philosophers to engage with others from other traditions might be responsible for this epistemic lopsidedness and marginalisation. I go beyond the re-statement of this problem of marginalisation of African philosophy to point out relevant doctrines from the African place. I show how they are united under the methodological and ideological disposition of conversationalism. I argue that this ideology might be a better model for realising the goal of global epistemic justice which is the overcoming of all forms of exclusions and lopsidedness in global epistemic discourses through fair allocation of intellectual spaces. |
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Keywords: | African philosophy global justice global epistemic justice conversational thinking epistemic injustice conversationalism |
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