Objective Explanations of Individual Well-being |
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Authors: | J Varelius |
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Institution: | (1) Pennimaenkuja 5 a 4, 21330 Paattinen, Finland; E-mail |
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Abstract: | Empirical research on questions pertaining to individual well-being is informed by the researchers' philosophical conception
of the nature of well-being and, consequently, the adequacy of such research is partly determined by the plausibility of this
conception. Philosophical theories of human well-being divide into subjective and objective. Subjective theories make our
well-being dependent on our attitudes of favour and disfavour. Objective theories deny this dependency. This article discusses
objective theories of individual well-being from the point of view of their explanatory power and argues that these theories
are unable to provide an acceptable account of the prudential goodness of what they consider to be good for human beings.
The article concludes by discussing some implications of its main argument to empirical research on questions pertaining to
individual well-being.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. |
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Keywords: | subjectivism objectivism happiness well-being prudential value explanation |
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