On the Normative Authority of Others |
| |
Authors: | Yonatan Shemmer |
| |
Affiliation: | 1. Department of Philosophy, The University of Sheffield, 45 Victoria St., Sheffield, UK, S3 7QB
|
| |
Abstract: | Gibbard argues that we have to accord others a certain fundamental epistemic normative authority. To avoid skepticism we must accept some of our normative principles; since the influence of others was a major factor in the process that led us to adopt them, we must accord others fundamental normative authority. The argument ought to be of interest to a wide range of philosophers, since while compatible with expressivism, it does not assume expressivism. It has rarely been discussed. In this essay I analyse the argument, explain why it is not sound and make a suggestion about the real upshot of the rejection of normative skepticism. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|