Conflicting desire and the child's theory of mind |
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| Institution: | 1. National Institute of Aquatic Resources (DTU Aqua), Technical University of Denmark, Jægersborg Allé 1, 2920 Charlottenlund, Denmark;2. Nørrebrogade 52a, 5th, 2200 Copenhagen N, Denmark;1. Department of Mathematics, National Tsing Hua University, Hsinchu 300, Taiwan;2. Dipartimento di Matematica, University of Bologna, Piazza Porta San Donato 5, 40126 Bologna, Italy;1. Departamento Clínico, Facultad de Ciencias Biomédicas, Universidad Europea de Madrid, Madrid, Spain;2. Departamento de Urología, Hospital de Clínicas José de San Martín, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, Argentina;3. Departamento de Urologia, Instituto do Cancer Dr. Arnaldo Vieira de Carvalho, São Paulo, Brazil;4. Especialista consultor en Urología y Andrología, Buenos Aires, Argentina;5. Departamento de Urología, Hospital Universitario de Caracas, Universidad Central de Venezuela, Caracas, Venezuela;6. Departamento de Urología, Wake Forest Baptist Medical Center, Wake Forest School of Medicine, Winston-Salem, NC, United States;1. University of Louisville, United States;2. University of Michigan, United States |
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| Abstract: | We contrast the standard representational theory-of-mind approach to the understanding of mental states with an alternative view that theory-of-mind tasks require executive functioning or the inhibition of more “cognitively salient” information. Two experiments test the hypothesis that 3-year-olds' apparent problems on theory-of-mind tasks are not due to an inability to represent the mental contents of another, but rather lie in the informational structure of the task. In Experiment 1, 3- to 5-year-olds were tested on their understanding of desire in others either when they themselves held a strong and conflicting desire or when they had no strong desire. Results showed that under the condition of having a strong and conflicting desire, only 5-year-olds were able to recognize that another person may desire something different. In contrast, when the children themselves held no strong desire, even 3-year-olds were able to judge another's desire correctly. Experiment 2 compared 3-year-olds' performance on a standard false-belief task with an equivalently structured desire task in which participants had again to inhibit their own strong and conflicting desire. Results showed similar performance on the traditional false-belief task and the new conflicting-desire task. |
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