Acting virtuously as an end in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics |
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Authors: | Sukaina Hirji |
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Institution: | 1. Department of Philosophy, College of Liberal Arts and Human Sciences, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA, USAshirji@vt.edu |
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Abstract: | ABSTRACTSometimes, in the Nicomachean Ethics (NE), Aristotle describes virtuous actions as the sorts of actions that are ends; it is important for Aristotle to do so if he wants to maintain, as he seems to at least until NE 10.7–8, that virtuous actions are a constituent of eudaimonia. At other times, he claims that virtuous actions are the sorts of actions that are for the sake of ends beyond themselves; after all, no one would choose to go into battle or give away a significant portion of their wealth if it did not realize some good end. In this paper, I review the familiar problem raised by Aristotle’s discussion of the nature of virtuous actions, propose a solution to this problem by appealing to a distinction between virtuous actions and ‘acting virtuously’, and sketch the significance of this solution for understanding the relationship between virtue and human happiness. |
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Keywords: | Aristotle ethics virtue eudaimonia virtuous actions |
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