Memory aids and the Cartesian circle

ABSTRACT

In answering the circularity charge, Descartes consistently distinguished between truths whose demonstrations we currently perceive clearly and distinctly (call these ‘C-truths’) and truths whose demonstrations we merely remember having perceived clearly and distinctly (call these ‘R-truths’). Descartes uses C-truths to prove God’s existence, thus validating R-truths. While avoiding one form of circularity (using C-truths to validate C-truths), this introduces another circle, for Descartes believes that God’s existence validates R-truths even when itself an R-truth. I consider Newman and Nelson’s grounds enhancement strategy according to which this problem is solved when God’s existence is rendered axiomatic. I argue that since it is still possible to doubt axioms when not directly apprehending them, this strategy cannot work; having to reproduce the argument for God’s existence in face of sceptical doubt is unavoidable. Drawing both on Newman and Nelson’s notion of grounds enhancement and on reproducibility interpretations, I argue that reproducibility can be enhanced via memory aids. Although discussion of memory and the Cartesian circle has been sidelined since Frankfurt’s 1962 refutation of Doney’s memory interpretation, I argue that memory is at the heart of the matter after all (though not in the same way Doney thought).