The Feeling of Knowing: Some Metatheoretical Implications for Consciousness and Control |
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| Affiliation: | 1. University of Colorado Boulder, United States;2. Tel Aviv University, Israel;3. Ben Gurion University, Israel;4. University of California, Santa Barbara, United States;5. Decision Research and University of Oregon, United States;1. Werner Reichardt Centre for Integrative Neuroscience, University of Tübingen, Tübingen 72076, Germany;2. McGill University Integrated Program in Neuroscience, Montréal H3A 2B4, Canada;3. Institute for Philosophy II, Ruhr University, Bochum 44780, Germany;4. Grupo Conocimiento, Filosofía, Ciencia, Historia y Sociedad, Instituto de Filosofía, Universidad de Antioquia, Colombia;1. Department of Psychology, Florida International University, University Park, Miami, FL 33199, USA;2. Inserm u1114, Federation of Translational Medicine of Strasbourg (FMTS), University of Strasbourg, France |
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| Abstract: | The study of the feeling of knowing may have implications for some of the metatheoretical issues concerning consciousness and control. Assuming a distinction between information-based and experience-based metacognitive judgments, it is argued that the sheer phenomenological experience of knowing (“noetic feeling”) occupies a unique role in mediating between implicit-automatic processes, on the one hand, and explicit-controlled processes, on the other. Rather than reflecting direct access to memory traces, noetic feelings are based on inferential heuristics that operate implicitly and unintentionally. Once such heuristics give rise to a conscious feeling that feeling can then affect controlled action. Examination of the cues that affect noetic feelings suggest that not only do these feelings inform controlled action, but they are also informed by feedback from the outcome of that action. |
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