| Abstract: | This paper presents a new account of Hume’s “probability of causes”. There are two main results attained in this investigation.
The first, and perhaps the most significant, is that Hume developed – albeit informally – an essentially sound system of probabilistic
inductive logic that turns out to be a powerful forerunner of Carnap’s systems. The Humean set of principles include, along
with rules that turn out to be new for us, well known Carnapian principles, such as the axioms of semiregularity, symmetry
with respect to individuals (exchangeability), predictive irrelevance and positive instantial relevance. The second result
is that Hume developed an original conception of probability, which is subjective in character, although it differs from contemporary
personalistic views because it includes constraints that are additional to simple consistency and do not vary between different
persons. The final section is a response to Gower’s thesis, by which Hume’s probability of causes is essentially non-Bayesian
in character. It is argued that, on closer examination, Gower’s reading of the relevant passages is untenable and that, on
the contrary, they are in accordance with the Bayesian reconstruction presented in this paper.
This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. |
