In Defence of Bad Science and Irrational Policies: an Alternative Account of the Precautionary Principle |
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Authors: | Stephen John |
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Institution: | (1) Hughes Hall, University of Cambridge, Mortimer Road, Cambridge, CB1 2EW, UK |
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Abstract: | In the first part of the paper, three objections to the precautionary principle are outlined: the principle requires some
account of how to balance risks of significant harms; the principle focuses on action and ignores the costs of inaction; and
the principle threatens epistemic anarchy. I argue that these objections may overlook two distinctive features of precautionary
thought: a suspicion of the value of “full scientific certainty”; and a desire to distinguish environmental doings from allowings.
In Section 2, I argue that any simple distinction between environmental doings and allowings is untenable. However, I argue
that the appeal of such a distinction can be captured within a relational account of environmental equity. In Section 3 I
show how the proposed account of environmental justice can generate a justification for distinctively “precautionary” policy-making. |
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