A commentary on Rönnberg's distinction between perception and cognition |
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Authors: | TOMMY GÄ RLING |
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Affiliation: | Department of Psychology, University of Umeå, Umeå, Sweden |
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Abstract: | In a commentary on a note by Rönnberg (Rönnberg, J. On the distinction between perception and cognition. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology , 1990, 31 , 154–156), it is argued that one of Rönnberg's criteria for theoretically distinguishing perception from cognition, that of different biological purposes, is invalid. Congruent with a broad definition of perception and cognition which most researchers agree upon, Rönnberg's two other criteria essentially state that how internally represented information is processed distinguishes between perception and cognition. However, the more strict criterion of whether explicit retrieval of information from memory is necessary is too dependent on a particular, rather limited theoretical framework. A third, less theory-dependent criterion of whether the information available in the stimulus is sufficient to account for comprehension may be useful in research which investigates hypotheses about similarities between perception and cognition. |
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Keywords: | Perception cognition metatheory |
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