Die Welt und die Evidenz. Zu Husserls Erledigung des Cartesianismus |
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Authors: | Vittorio De Palma |
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Institution: | 1. Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici, Via Monte di Dio 14, 80132, Naples, Italy
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Abstract: | This paper aims to show that Husserl’s thought represents a dismissal of Cartesianism. I argue that at the basis of Husserl’s thought lies an account of perception and evidence that is completely different from Descartes’. Anticipating an insight which will be developed by analytical philosophy, Husserl claims that a perception or evidence can be called into question only on the basis of other perceptions and evidences. Indeed, all questioning of a single perception or evidence presupposes that perception and evidence are reliable and cannot concern perception and evidence as such, but only their single instances. Therefore, phenomenological reduction is not a methodological doubt, and Husserl’s cogito has a different meaning from Descartes’ cogito. This approach is based on an account of reality, at the core of which lies the identification between what is real and what is experienceable, but it does not lead to a reduction of things to consciousness. |
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