On what we can ensure |
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Authors: | Benjamin Schnieder |
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Affiliation: | (1) Department of Philosophy, University of Hamburg, Von-Melle-Park 6, 20146 Hamburg, Germany |
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Abstract: | The Conjunction Principle says, roughly, that if the truth of a conjunction can be brought about, then the truth of each conjunct can be brought about. The current essay argues that this principle is not valid. After a clarification of the principle, it is shown how a proper understanding of the involved notions falsify the principle. As a corollary, a recent attack on van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument will be rebutted, because it relies on the invalid conjunction principle. |
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Keywords: | Compatibilism Ability Ensure the truth of something Principle beta |
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