The non-abstractness of mental representations |
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Affiliation: | 1. Department of Psychology, University of Exeter, UK;2. Department of Psychology, Lancaster University, UK;1. The University of New South Wales, Australia;2. Western Sydney University, Australia;1. Department of Biomedical and Clinical Sciences ‘Luigi Sacco’, Università degli Studi di Milano, Milan, Italy;2. Department of Pathophysiology and Transplantation, Università degli Studi di Milano, Milan, Italy |
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Abstract: | An argument is made that formal abstract mental representations are lacking because they fail to accommodate the contribution of the medium. The importance of the medium is singled out and several respects in which it resists formal characterization noted. Specifically, it is pointed out that the medium can always be relevant, that the aspects by which it is made so are not in principle demarcated or constrained, and that they cannot be restricted a priori at the time of encoding. The examination of several ways by which specifications of medium could be incorporated into mental representations suggests that to obtain a full account of the medium one has to abandon some basic characteristics of mental representations. Conversely, maintaining the concept of mental representation in its standard sense leaves the medium, and with it some fundamental properties of human cognition, outside of one's scientific account. This conclusion serves as the basis for more general comments regarding the study of mind. |
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