The ontology of intentionality II: dependence ontology as prolegomenon to noetic modal semantics |
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Authors: | Gilbert T Null |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin, Green Bay, WI 54311-7001, USA;(2) 1903 Lakeside Place, Green Bay, WI 54302, USA |
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Abstract: | This is the second in a sequence of three essays which axiomatize and apply Edmund Husserl's dependence ontology of parts
and wholes as a non-Diodorean, non-Kantian temporal semantics for first-order predicate modal languages. The Ontology of Intentionality I introduced enough of Husserl's dependence-ontology of parts and wholes to formulate his account of order as effected by relating
moments of unity, and The Ontology of Intentionality II extends that axiomatic dependence-ontology far enough to enable its semantic application. Formalizing the compatibility Vereinbarkeit] relation implicated in Husserl's notorious doctrine of impossible meanings, the essay introduces a compatibility restriction on relations to formulate Husserl's distinction between singular einheitliche] and plural mehrheitliche] objects, using plural relating moments to define first-order versions of Husserl's notions of relation complexes (i.e. Sachverhalte), abstracta of n-ary relation complexes, categorial relations, abstract eide as unifications of categorial relations, semantic domains as completions of abstract eide, and material regions as semantic domains which are compatibility upper bounds of categorial relations. These concepts will enable the formal dependence-ontological
noetic semantics for two-valued, first-order modal languages introduced in the sequel Two-Valued Logics of Intentionality, the third essay in the sequence. |
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Keywords: | Collective realism Dependence Formal semantics Husserl Intentionality Intensionality Individuals Mereology Moments of unity Part -whole Pieces Plurality Ontology Relations Unity Universals Urelements Zermelo |
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