The natural history of information processors

By spanning the traditional scientific theories in the search for an epistemological home for information it is found that Physics (together with some inputs from Automata Theory) provides the criteria to identify the universals that characterize information processors. It is well known, however, that Physics and Mathematics alone are insufficient to answer some fundamental questions that arise in further speculations on the subject of information. It seems that Biology, in the realm of Evolution Theory and in terms of Natural Selection, is at present the only place able to offer the objective context required to properly characterize information as an object of scientific inquiry.

In this communication we intend to show, by establishing a working equivalence between the epistemological questions that should characterize a theory of information and those questions that characterize the science of Biology, how a science of information can be more objectively characterized. It is only by referring to selective pressures that we can solve the otherwise unanswerable philosophical question of whether it is possible to know if two players of a game are, in fact, playing the same game (the semantic question). It is also shown that it is possible, by using conventional criteria, to establish a phylogenesis of information processors from where we conclude that every information processor now existing in the universe (even computers and robots) has an ancestor that has once been a living being.

It is here suggested, however, that Biology is only a provisory epistemological ground for laying the foundations of an information science. A more inclusive theory should be founded on a generalization of the Theory of Evolution where mutation and natural selection should be described, not in terms of the characteristic media and mechanisms of biological systems, but of the identified universals of information processors.