The special status of instrumental reasons |
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Authors: | Stephanie Beardman |
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Institution: | (1) Columbia University, Barnard College, 3009 Broadway, Milbank 326, New York, NY 10027, USA |
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Abstract: | The rationality of means-end reasoning is the bedrock of the Humean account of practical reasons. But the normativity of such
reasoning can not be taken for granted. I consider and reject the idea that the normativity of instrumental reasoning can
be explained – either in terms of its being constitutive of the very notion of having an end, or solely in terms of instrumental
considerations. I argue that the instrumental principle is itself a brute norm, and that this is consistent with a Humean
account of practical reasons. |
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Keywords: | |
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