Begging what is at issue in the argument |
| |
Authors: | Don S. Levi |
| |
Affiliation: | (1) Philosophy Department, University of Oregon, 97403 Eugene, OR, USA |
| |
Abstract: | This paper objects to treating begging the question as circular reasoning. It argues that what is at issue in the argument is not to be confused with the claim or position that the arguer is adopting, and that logicians from Aristotle on give the wrong definition and have difficulty making sense of the fallacy because they try to define it in terms of how an argument is defined by logical theory - as a sequence consisting of premises followed by a conclusion. That the problematic about begging the question depends on treating an argument as a context-less sequence of statements seems to be anticipated by the pragma-dialectical approach. The paper offers a critique of this dialogical approach, as exemplified by Douglas Walton in his recent book on begging the question, on the grounds that it raises more problems than it solves. It concludes with the suggestion that what is really at issue in discussions of begging the question is the need for a theory of fallacy. |
| |
Keywords: | Begging the question what is at issue sequence of premises and conclusion theory of fallacy rhetorical context participating in the argument dialogue pragmatics |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|