The Hubris of Transcendental Idealism

Jan Pato?ka’s early phenomenology, as presented in The Natural World as a Philosophical Problem, does not merely adopt Husserl’s concept of the lifeworld. The paper demonstrates the originality of Pato?ka’s appropriation of this concept, but also its internal tensions and difficulties. Seeking to elaborate a concept of a phenomenology allowing for a theory of the lifeworld stricto sensu, i.e. of the life of the world, Pato?ka’s book effectively shows that there is no ahistorical, absolute or “natural” starting point for phenomenology. Truth, as approachable through phenomenology, is not (pre)given, but must rather be developed. Elaborating on the concept of transcendental idealism, Pato?ka’s early phenomenology thus suggests a vivid idea of “intermeshing” monads ontologically grounding the world.