Challenging epistemology: Interactive proofs and zero knowledge |
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Institution: | Group in Logic and the Methodology of Science, University of California, 910 Evans Hall #3840, Berkeley, CA 94720-3840, USA |
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Abstract: | This essay explores what (if anything) research on interactive zero knowledge proofs has to teach philosophers about the epistemology of mathematics and theoretical computer science. Though such proof systems initially appear ‘revolutionary’ and are a nonstandard conception of ‘proof’, I will argue that they do not have much philosophical import. Possible lessons from this work for the epistemology of mathematics—our models of mathematical proof should incorporate interaction, our theories of mathematical evidence must account for probabilistic evidence, our valuation of a mathematical proof should solely focus on its persuasive power—are either misguided or old hat. And while the differences between interactive and mathematical proofs suggest the need to develop a separate epistemology of theoretical computer science (or at least complexity theory) that differs from our theory of mathematical knowledge, a casual look at the actual practice of complexity theory indicates that such a distinct epistemology may not be necessary. |
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