Through the forest of motor representations |
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| Institution: | 1. State Key Laboratory of Brain and Cognitive Science, Institute of Psychology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100101, China;2. Tsinghua National Laboratory for Information Science and Technology, Department of Computer Science and Technology, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China;3. Sackler Centre for Consciousness Science and School of Psychology, University of Sussex, BN1 9QH Brighton, United Kingdom;1. Institute of Neural Engineering, Graz University of Technology, Stremayrgasse 16/IV, 8010 Graz, Austria;2. Institute of Psychology, University of Graz, Universitätsplatz 2, 8010 Graz, Austria;3. BioTechMed-Graz, Graz, Austria;1. Radboud University Nijmegen, Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behaviour, PO Box 9104, 6500 HE Nijmegen, The Netherlands;2. University of Parma, Department of Neuroscience—Section of Physiology, Via Volturno 39, 43120 Parma, Italy;3. University of California, San Diego, Department of Philosophy, Interdisciplinary Cognitive Sciences Program, 9500 Gilman Drive, La Jolla, San Diego, CA 92093, USA;1. Neurosciences Program, Stanford BioX, Stanford Neurosciences Institute, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305, USA;2. Departments of Electrical Engineering, Bioengineering, and Neurobiology, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305, USA;3. Howard Hughes Medical Institute, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305, USA;1. Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, London WC1N 3AZ, UK;2. WIN Centre, Nuffield Department of Clinical Neuroscience, University of Oxford, Headington, Oxford OX3 9DU, UK;3. Max Planck University College London Centre for Computational Psychiatry and Ageing Research, University College London, London WC1B 5EH, UK;4. Department of Neurology, Neuropsychology Unit, University Hospital Zurich, Switzerland |
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| Abstract: | Following neuroscience, and using different labels, several philosophers have addressed the idea of the presence of a single representational mechanism lying in between (visual) perceptual processes and motor processes involved in different functions and useful for shaping suitable action performances: a motor representation (MR). MRs are the naturalized mental antecedents of action. This paper presents a new, non-monolithic view of MRs, according to which, contrarily to the received view, when looking at in between (visual) perceptual processes and motor processes, we find not only a single representational mechanism with different functions, but an ensemble of different sub-representational phenomena, each of which with a different function. This new view is able to avoid several issues emerging from the literature and to address something the literature is silent about, which however turns out to be crucial for a theory of MRs. |
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| Keywords: | Motor representations The two visual systems model Visuomotor processing Action possibilities Ventro-dorsal visual sub-system |
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