Aiming at Truth: Doxastic vs. Epistemic Goals |
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Authors: | Hamid Vahid |
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Institution: | (1) Analytic Philosophy Faculty, IPM, P.O. Box 19395-5746, Tehran, Iran |
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Abstract: | Belief is generally thought to be the primary cognitive state representing the world as being a certain way, regulating our
behavior and guiding us around the world. It is thus regarded as being constitutively linked with the truth of its content.
This feature of belief has been famously captured in the thesis that believing is a purposive state aiming at truth. It has
however proved to be notoriously difficult to explain what the thesis really involves. In this paper, I begin by critically
examining a number of recent attempts to unpack the metaphor. I shall then proceed to highlight an error that seems to cripple
most of these attempts. This involves the confusion between, what I call, doxastic and epistemic goals. Finally, having offered
my own positive account of the aim-of-belief thesis, I shall underline its deflationary nature by distinguishing between aiming
at truth and hitting that target (truth). I end by comparing the account with certain prominent inflationary theories of the
nature of belief.
I am grateful to Muhammed Legenhausen, David Velleman and an
anonymous referee of this journal for helpful comments on earlier drafts of
this paper. |
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