Learned helplessness, attribution theory, and the nature of cognitions: A critical evaluation

Seligman’s learned helplessness model of depression has received a great deal of attention in the literature during recent years. The model claims that depressives typically invoke internal, stable, and global causal explanations for negative life events. An examination of the experimental evidence suggests that the model does not enjoy unequivocal empirical support. Differences between depressed and nondepressed individuals in terms of their cognitions are found to be both smaller and less consistent than hypothesized, and the causal role ascribed to depressive attributional style is questioned. It is suggested that these inconsistencies arise because of the nature of the experimental work carried out and the failure to examine attributions in ecologically sound environments. Having already turned to attribution theory in order to resolve earlier inconsistencies, it is argued that the model could further benefit from an examination of that part of attribution theory concerned with the circular nature of causal explanation. This review arose from the empirical work of the Leeds Family Research Centre. Department of Psychology, University of Leeds, and in particular has benefited considerably from discussions with Peter Stratton, Dorothy Heard, Helga Hanks, and Chris Brewin.