Losing to Terrorism: An American Work in Progress

Abstract: The evolution of the U.S. war on terrorism is on a path that poses a substantial probability of losing to it, although not necessarily of a victory by its declared targets. That conclusion follows from the definition presented of terrorism and thus central questions about the merits of responses justified by an objective of reducing it. Likely American responses to 9/11 are suggested by a review of well‐known policy‐making tendencies from past scholarship and experience, tendencies well‐established prior to 9/11 and by no means unique to the Bush II presidency. The expectations those tendencies suggest have been born out by what the United States has done and not done. Well‐established criteria and their implied rules of practice for security enhancing great‐power statecraft are presented, and the chosen U.S. program of action is found to be counter‐productive in their light.