The philosophical legacy of Meehl (1978): confirmation theory, theory quality, and scientific epistemology

The reach and impact of Paul Meehl’s work is extraordinary. Focusing on his “Theoretical Risks and Tabular Asterisks”, I trace three consequences of his findings. The first is the influence of his work on confirmation theory in the philosophy of science, in which he provided a more sophisticated alternative to Popperianism, despite some affinities with it. The second is a clear focus on the evaluation of theory quality as an explanation for the success of hard vs. soft theories. The third is a very deep critique of the practices of contemporary epistemology; his research recommends the replacement of demonstrably unreliable, subjective judgments about justification and knowledge with simple predictive models that outperform human experts. This is an impressive array of intellectual contributions to psychology and philosophy. As influential as his work was, it is just now beginning to receive attention commensurate with its merits.