Indirect Realism with a Human Face

Epistemic Indirect Realism (EIR) is the position that justification for contingent propositions about the extra‐mental world requires an inference based on a subjective, experiential mental state. One objection against EIR is that it runs contrary to common sense and practice; in essence, ordinary people do not form beliefs about things in the external world on the basis of experiential mental states. This objection implies EIR is contrary to ordinary experience, impractical, and leads to scepticism. In this paper, I will defend EIR against this objection by distinguishing EIR based on conceptual awareness and non‐conceptual awareness. In particular, I will argue that direct acquaintance provides sufficient (non‐conceptual) awareness that can explain how ordinary folks are capable of forming justified beliefs about the external world in a way consistent with EIR. Overall, I present a framework for showing that EIR can satisfy ordinary epistemic practices without betraying human nature or over‐intellectualizing the required epistemic standards for possessing a justified belief.